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A Future for the Dead Sea Basin: Water Culture among Israelis,
Palestinians and Jordanians
Summary
The Dead Sea basin plays a major role for regional economic development (industry, tourism
and agriculture) in the Middle East. This potential is threatened by the steady disappearance
of the Dead Sea. Since around 1930 the water level of the Dead Sea has fallen by about 25 m,
about half of this alone in the last 20 years. The Dead Sea is a transboundary resource shared
by Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan. The Dead Sea is the terminal point of the
Jordan River watershed and as such, it serves as a barometer for the health of the overall
system. Its rapid decline reflects the present water management strategies of the riparian and
upstream countries. This includes the different water cultures of the three countries.
Throughout history, the Dead Sea basin has served as a source of refuge and inspiration for
followers of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Today, the religious significance of the Dead
Sea is being overshadowed by its rapid disappearance. This may be explained in part by the
water cultures of the three countries that influence water policy in the region. Ideology,
together with culture and tradition, such as that of Zionism in Israel, has played a central role
in water development in the region. In many cases, this has been at the expense of the
environment. Elements pertaining to environmental security and water culture and tradition,
whereby a sustainably managed environment provides for social, economic as well as
environmental benefits are evident with regards the Dead Sea. The decline for example,
undermines its potential as a tourist destination, despite the enormous investment in hotel and
resort infrastructures in Israel and in Jordan. The decline also raises ethical issues about the
exploitation of water resources by present generations at the expense of this natural heritage
to future generations. This paper provides an analysis of a European Union funded project
whose aims are to synthesize and assess existing physical and socio-economic data and to
assess options for a better future for the Dead Sea. It will identify the patterns of water supply
and use in the region, and the factors that control these patterns, including those of water
culture. The underlying assumption is that solutions for a more sustainable development than
today’s scenario will not come from simply providing "more water for more development",
but from a new land and water management system, indeed ethic, that is sensitive to social,
cultural and ecological resources thereby providing security and stability across cultures,
economic sectors and nations.
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Introduction
Both national policy and research focusing on water scarcity in the Middle East take a
regional or national perspective, with emphasis in the literature on alternatives to
conflict (Postel 1993; Lowi 1993; Gleick 1994; Gleick 1993; Frederick 1996;
Flakenmark 1986; Feitelson 2000; Lipchin 1997; Postel & Wolf 2001). Studies have
and are being conducted on hydro-economic and hydro-political approaches (Wolf &
Lonergan 1995; 1994) or on technological fixes (Hamberg 1995; Gavrieli et al. 2002;
Shelef 1995; Segev 1995) as ways of finding solutions to water scarcity in the face of
increasing demand. This study explores an as yet little studied, but critical component
of the water management system in the region: the influence of water culture on the
public’s perceptions and attitudes toward water use.
Resource use behavior of local communities is fast becoming realized as
integral to the drafting of sustainable resource policy that is advocated at a national
level but implemented at a local level. Policies and programs are strengthened when
they can account for linkages between local communities and national policy.
Increased local participation strengthens resource behaviors that are sustainable by
making the policy process more responsive to local concerns. In addition, local
ownership, involvement or participation can raise awareness about resource concerns
such as that of water scarcity and in so doing make programs more sustainable. A
first step in this approach is the assessment of the culture of water that may exist in
the region and it’s impact on the resource of concern.
Successful employment of preferred policy strategies and technologies will
require an understanding of the social environment in which they are to be applied
i.e.: the cultural context in which they operate. For example, the social drivers which
promote involvement in recycling may vary between households and cultures, and
will certainly be different for domestic, commercial and industrial users. In particular,
the application of water recycling systems (i.e. the procedure of locating and
operating them) within households or communities, can be severely disrupted if some
understanding of key factors such as perceived need and benefit and cultural
sensitivities towards using recycled water is not acquired (Jeffrey 2000; Jeffrey 2000;
Jeffrey & Seaton 1998). Our focus is on the variability in perceptions of, and attitudes
towards, water use and the impacts of use on the ecosystem among three water
cultures: Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian, and how this is manifested in the Dead
Sea basin..
Understanding the social and cultural dimensions of water use and
management are now seen as central to the development of sustainable water
management practices (Lipchin 2000; Hellstrom et al. 2000). At a practitioner level,
knowledge derived from cross-cultural studies is of increasing relevance to those
charged with managing and preserving our natural resources. Indeed, Hoekstra (1998)
has suggested that many of the current controversies among water researchers and
policy makers can be explained by the existence of different cultural perspectives
Lipchin, C.
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(Hoekstra 1988). These perspectives differ in their underlying basic values, beliefs
and assumptions (perceptions and attitudes). He also points out that many water issues
are not only technical problems but are also value laden. Hence, the path toward a
solution is more complex than a simple technological “fix”.
This is because irrespective of what conclusions the scientific evidence leads
to, the impressions and attitudes which the public hold can speedily and effectively
bring a halt to any project or scheme (Jeffrey 2000; Jeffrey & Seaton 1998). The
issues here are both complex and complicated, having to do with beliefs, attitudes and
trust. Furthermore, it is important to expose the public’s own agenda for discussing
and debating water problems and solutions. By conducting social enquiry at an early
stage, we can test how policies and technologies might be received by individuals or
groups of individuals. Subsequent feedback into technology or project design
(perhaps in terms of appropriate scale, technology or location preferences) can
forestall ineffective or inefficient application when the public is an equal partner in
the decision making process.
Although the increasingly heterogeneous nature of our societies (at both nation
state and regional levels) presents new challenges in managing water resources within
a culturally diverse setting, research which can provide guidance to practitioners on
such issues is sparse. As Dr. Mahmoud Abu-Zeid, president of the World Water
Council has noted:” The cultural and socio-economic values of water are still a very
elusive subject” (Abu-Zeid 1998).
Studies of cultural influences on water quality and water use have been carried
out since the late 1950’s (originally in the USA, but lately in Europe, Central America
and Africa). None to this author’s knowledge have yet been conducted in the Middle
East.
The link between cultural context and attitudes to environmental and
technological risk, for example, has been well articulated by Douglas & Wildavsky
(1982). A review on the social bases of public concern with environmental quality has
been carried out by Van Liere and Dunlap (1980). They examined the explanatory
power of several sociodemographic and socioeconomic variables in explaining
environmental concern. The results indicate a complex picture where it is not only the
young, well-educated and liberal segments of society that display environmental
concern (Van Liere & Dunlap 1980). What this and other studies show is that society
is more complex than many policy makers care to consider ( Jeffrey & Seaton 1998).
In water and natural resource exploitation studies in particular, cultural or
ethnic background has been identified as a key indicator of both attitudes and
behaviour. In a broad context, Panday (1990) has addressed the cross-cultural
psychology of environmental perception and behaviour in an effort to understand how
different societies relate to their physical environments (Pandey 1990). The precise
influence of cultural variables in individual attitudes towards and interactions with the
water environment have been partially investigated by several authors (Murdock et al.
1988; Burmil et al. 1999), highlighting in particular, the multi-faceted role which
water plays in arid and semi-arid environments. But studies which look at specific
Lipchin, C.
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technological applications are few (for a rare exception to this trend see (Fry &
Mingledorff 1996 )). Ethnicity has been shown to be a predictor of actual water
conservation behaviour in the United States (Oliver 1999), with Anglo’s responding
relatively poorly to voluntary conservation programmes as compared with non-Anglo
populations, but equally well to mandatory conservation initiatives. Cultural factors
have recently been identified as a key moderator in wastewater reuse for fish farming
in Egypt (Mancy et al. 2000).
I argue therefore that projects for sustainability require a holistic and
integrated approach that takes into account the overall cultural context in which and
by which, water is used. Community measures (income, health, education) and
resource measures (quality, quantity, consumption) coupled with the participation and
empowerment of local communities (Hoon & Singh 1997) should be the preffered
methodological approach in water management.
The aim of this study is to consequently explore how differences and
commonalties in water culture influence attitudes and perceptions toward water use.
The field of study was the Dead Sea basin. The Dead Sea basin is a transboundary
resource shared by Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians.
The study sought to explore the following question: How does one’s cultural
context correlate with the attitudes and perceptions people hold toward water
resources and water use policies in the region in general and in the Dead Sea basin in
particular?
Study Area
The Dead Sea basin has a size of about 44,000 km² and its watershed is shared by
Israel, Jordan and Palestine (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. The Dead
www.deadseaproject.org)

Sea

watershed

(Source:

Dead

Sea

Project,

The basin plays a major role for regional economic development. Current economic activities in the basin are industrial (mineral extraction and water bottling),
tourism and agriculture. The Dead Sea’s mineral composition and the unique climate
provide treatment for skin diseases, especially for psoriasis and atopic dermatitis
(Schempp 2000). The health and cultural features plus the unique landscape have
made the area attractive for tourism. Besides the regional relevance, the basin has a
global importance. Since 1998 there have been efforts to promote the Dead Sea basin
as a UNESCO Man and Biosphere Reserve and a World Heritage site (Abu-Faris et
Lipchin, C.
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al. 1999) because it is a both a unique habitat for wildlife (particularly important
around springs and wadis (e.g. Ain Fashkha, Ain Gedi, Wadi Mujib) and a global
cultural heritage site with some of the world’s oldest human settlements (e.g. the city
of Jericho and the mountain fortress of Masada).
The Dead Sea is the terminal lake of the Jordan Rift Valley. Its surface is
currently about 417 m below sea level which makes it the lowest point on earth. With
a salinity of about 3,000 mg/l it is also the most saline water body in the world
(Gertmann 1999). Rainfall is limited to winter months; it varies from about 500
mm/yr in the north-western highlands to less than 100 mm/yr in the valley floor (AlWeshah 2000). Perennial storage in surface and underground water reservoirs is limited and vulnerable to pollution and depletion. Potential evapotranspiration in the valley floor is about 2,000 mm/yr, and actual evaporation from the Dead Sea surface is
about 1,300-1,600 mm/yr (Stanhill 1984). The temperature is about 40°C in summer
and 15°C in winter (Assaf et al. 1998). At the east and west there are steep escarpments, while in the north and south, the valley stretches gently upward along the
Jordan River and along the Wadi Araba, respectively.
The historical Dead Sea consisted of two basins: the deep northern basin
(which is now the only remaining Dead Sea proper), and the shallow southern basin
from which the Dead Sea has retreated since 1978. The two basins are divided by the
Lisan Peninsula.
The land cover is mostly open with little vegetation. Sensitive areas include
the Lisan peninsula area, marshlands and wetlands at the northern and southern ends
of the Dead Sea, the Wadi Mujib, the Ain Gedi oasis, and the Dead Sea itself (Fariz
2002). Lack of natural freshwater, expansion of human settlements, and inappropriate
land use has affected these areas (Gebetsroither et al. 2004 ).
Waste waters from local domestic, agricultural, industrial and tourist activities
flow directly into the Dead Sea. Raw sewage flows into the Dead Sea from JerusalemBethlehem urban areas via the Wadi Nar (Kidron valley). Water shortage and land
degradation are a problem all over the basin and these are likely to exacerbate with
population growth (Rishmawi & Hrimat 1999 ).
The most visible and most disturbing degradation is the decline of the Dead
Sea water level and volume. Since around 1930 the water level of the Dead Sea has
fallen by about 25 m, about half of this alone in the last 20 years (Anati. D.A. &
Shasha 1989; Assaf et al. 1998). In the past few years the rate of decline was 80-100
cm per year. The last available data from mid-2003 indicate a water level of -417 m
(Figure 2). As a result of this decline, in the last 20 years the Dead Sea surface area
has shrunk by about 30 %, and its north-south extent has shrunk from over 75 to 55
km (Anati. D.A. & Shasha 1989). Since 1978, the Dead Sea has completely retreated
from the southern basin, which presently consists only of artificial evaporation ponds
used by the mineral extraction industry.
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Figure 2. Decline of Dead Sea water level 1976-2003 (Data from Israeli Hydrological
Service)
The reasons for this decline are well-known. First and foremost, the decline is
a direct consequence of the declining freshwater input: this includes decreasing
discharge from the River Jordan, increasing water use from natural springs and side
wadis, and extensive use of aquifers that provide secondary water input (Klein 1985 ).
Of all these factors, the River Jordan probably plays the biggest role (Lipchin 1997).
It may be said that the Dead Sea's steady disappearance is a direct result of the water
management strategies of the River Jordan riparians (Tal 2001). While 100 years ago
the River Jordan’s discharge into the Dead Sea was about 1,200-1,300 million cubic
meters per year (MCM/yr) of freshwater, it has been reduced to about 900 MCM/yr
by the 1940’s and now is not more than 100-200 MCM/yr of saline and polluted water
(Orthofer 2001; 1994; Al-Weshah 2000; Orthofer et al. 2001; Rabi 1997 ; Shavit
2001). The main reason for this decline is that water from the Upper Jordan River as
well as water from the Lower Jordan River tributaries (e.g. Yarmouk, Zarqa) has been
blocked and diverted for urban and agricultural uses inside and outside the watershed
by the basin riparians.
On top of the reduced freshwater input, more than 200 MCM/yr water are
pumped out of the Dead Sea into evaporation ponds in the shallow southern basin. It
is estimated that the salt industries contribute 25 to 30 % of the present total
evaporation rates (Wardam 2000).
It is not clear whether the Dead Sea water level has now come to equilibrium
between the reduced surface and a reduced evaporation, or if it will continue to
Lipchin, C.
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decline. As a result of the lowering of the water level, the adjacent aquifers are
seriously affected (Yechieli 1996). Sinkholes have opened up along the shoreline,
caused by lowered water tables and groundwater over-exploitation (Baer et al. 2002;
Bowman et al. 2000). These sinkholes are a serious threat to infrastructure around the
basin and have essentially halted future development plans such as the building of
new hotels (Figure 3). Furthermore, the decline of the Dead Sea also affects the
freshwater springs on its shores (e.g. Ain Fashkha and Ain Turiba) that support a
unique biodiversity (Friends of the Earth Middle East 2000; EcoPeace 1998). The
decline of the water level has also had a serious effect on tourism due to the
disappearance of the shoreline close to the hotels.

Figure 3: A series of sinkholes on the exposed shoreline on the western shore of the
northern basin of the Dead Sea (Photo: Clive Lipchin).
Without some form of intervention, the current trend is expected to continue
with potential disastrous effects for the future. The growing population in all three
countries will increase the pressure for the freshwater that currently remains unused.
The possible re-settlement of returning Palestinian refugees will also increase demand
in Palestine. Palestinians demand as part of a regional water agreement that more
water should be allowed to the Lower Jordan River and that this additional water
should be usable for the Palestinian population. This, of course, means that the Dead
Sea would not benefit. The declining Dead Sea undermines the potential as a tourist
destination, despite the enormous investment in hotel and resort infrastructures in
Israel and in Jordan. Over the next few years, there are plans for further tourism and
industrial development including the construction of over 50,000 new hotel rooms
(Meunier 1999). For the fledgling Palestinian economy, the present state of the Dead
Sea suggests that Palestinians may never have the opportunity to develop what should
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have been one of their more attractive tourist locations that could provide critical
employment to a growing workforce.
In all three countries, development policies have disregarded impacts on the
environment, indigenous people and small farmers. Essential water needs for nature
were neglected; policies lacked incentives to promote local forms of environmental
security and equitable access to natural goods and services. Water is increasingly
allocated to the urban sector and to large-scale agriculture at the expense of the needs
and rights of the rural and indigenous people. Consequently, the rural poor and
indigenous are overexploiting land resources to sustain their livelihoods.
Furthermore, the decline of the Dead Sea raises ethical issues regarding the
exploitation of present generations of water resources at the expense of the natural
heritage in the future. Many would argue that it represents an intolerable violation of
the rights of future generations.
Nonetheless there is concern in the region about the threat of a disappearing
Dead Sea (Coussin 2001; EcoPeace 1998), but very little progress. Most options for
solving the environmental and economical problems focus on the provision of “new
water from outside”, particularly through the building of a canal that will connect the
Red Sea with the Dead Sea (“Red-Dead Conveyance Project”) (Gavrieli et al. 2002).
This is a classical technological “fix” solution indicative of a centralized management
structure with little public involvement. Both Israeli and Jordanian governments
support this type of option (recently, the Israeli government has shown less
enthusiasm as it explores desalination plants on the Mediterranean coast). This 240
km conduit is expected to replenish the missing inflow from the Jordan River through
brine discharge from desalination, use the gravity pressure for desalination through
reverse osmosis for drinking water, and for production of electricity. Costs are estimated to be around 3 billion dollars (Pearce 1995). Financing for the project may
come from the World Bank. Among the questions which remain unclear are the
environmental impacts of the canal, e.g. the chemical changes of the water and the
economic viability of the project.
This study seeks to go beyond the centralized and technological approach to
saving the Dead Sea by approaching the problem from a more holistic and inclusive
perspective. It seeks to find out from the public (residents of the Dead Sea basin)
where they stand on the issues. What are their needs and priorities? What is important
to them and what alternatives are they willing to support? The study also seeks to
understand how one’s social context influences one’s perceptions and attitudes
towards the declining water levels of the Dead Sea basin. In other words, how does a
society’s water culture shape how a society approaches an issue such as that of the
disappearing Dead Sea. In responding to the crisis in the Dead Sea basin one needs to
examine the historical context of how each riparian’s water culture evolved and in
what direction it is headed in the future. This socio-cultural approach is valuable to
policy makers in providing clues on what types of interventions and programs may
elicit society’s acceptance or rejection.
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Water Culture in the Dead Sea Basin
Water Culture in Israel
With at least 60% of water going to agriculture in Israel, its unique role in local Israeli
culture and heritage must be understood and the practical manifestations integrated
into an assessment of water culture in Israel. Agriculture has historically enjoyed a
privileged place among Israeli decision-makers. Explanations for this were somewhat
self-evident during the 1950s and 1960s when agriculture provided some 30% of the
country’s GNP and most of the top political leadership had either immediate or
historical connections with agricultural communities (Hillel, 1994).
Zionism, the nationalistic ideology of the Jewish people always elevated
agricultural pursuits, encouraging “pioneer” immigrants to establish new settlements.
A variety of philosophers, most notably A.D. Gordon, espoused a Tolstoyic
perception that only through work connected to the land and soil could personal
redemption be achieved (Tal, 2002). Among agriculture’s additional merits that were
traditionally cited are: its contribution to “food security,” as a means of selfsufficiency, its role in stymieing land claims by Arabs (in particular Bedouins),
establishing territorial claims in the periphery of the country and in the past,
socialising new immigrants and reducing unemployment.
This ideological and cultural bias provides some explanation for present water
policies, which today are frequently inconsistent with economic and environmental
considerations (Lipchin, 2003). To begin with, the economic contribution of
agriculture to Israel’s economic profile has fallen to 3% of GNP and 2% of overall
employment. Crop subsidies nevertheless remain high for certain crops. Large-scale
water diversions for agriculture have also left a hydrological legacy of dry streams
and depleted aquifers (Lipchin, 2003 and Zaslavsky, 2002). None more so is the
National Water Carrier that diverts water from the Sea of Galilee in the northern part
of the Jordan river watershed to the south of the country for irrigation. This large scale
diversion scheme plays an important role in reducing the flow of water in the lower
Jordan and hence the amount of water that can reach the Dead Sea.
Part of the reason can of course be attributed to the political elites who
continue to dominate governmental decision-makers. Senior politicians and
government officials are disproportionately affiliated with the agricultural sector,
affecting their decisions about water allocation, pricing and distribution. The political
patronage of Israel’s top leadership to agricultural interests continues and they remain
protected in recent years regardless of party affiliation. For example, past Prime
Minister Ehud Barak, a “leftist” politician, was raised on an agricultural kibbutz,
while recent Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, head of a “right-wing” party makes his
home on a ranch in the Negev. Recently, a plan by the Israel Treasury to raise water
prices by 70% for the agricultural sector was tabled after intervention from the
Minister of Agriculture.
While the general public is increasingly urban in its domicile (over 90% of the
population in Israel live in moderate to large cities) Zionist’s veneration of ruralist
Lipchin, C.
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living remains a critical factor in the water culture of the national psyche. This is true
from an ideological perspective, with farming still considered among the more
admirable (albeit barely profitable) professions. Youth movements, a critical
socialisation factor for large segments of upper-middle class Israeli youth, still spend
considerable time in summer work camps in agricultural communities.
Agriculture also holds a place in the national aesthetic psyche. A recent study
by Fleisher et. al. (2001) from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem based on a
“willingness to pay” survey suggests that the value for passive use (among tourists)
for agricultural production in Israel’s Jezreel valley and Israel’s Huleh valley exceed
the actual production amounts. This is not inconsistent with similar preferences in
England, which has protected its bucolic countryside with legislation to subsidise
rural landscapes. Quite simply, Israelis like farms, and farmers have convinced
decision-makers (and to a certain extent the public at large) that the resulting
prodigious water consumption is justified (Lipchin, 2003).
Hence, it can be argued that there are dominating “ideological and cultural”
factors that explain the country’s ongoing commitment to agriculture and that by
association, water is just too valuable to flow freely in the country’s rivers and
streams. By this logic, the price now being paid by the Dead Sea is due to the
veneration of water for agriculture among all other needs. Within this context
however, the agricultural sector has increasingly come to understand that fresh water
is a scarce resource that will be largely replaced by treated wastewater and
desalination. At the same time, the growing of certain crops may become
prohibitively expensive or impossible due to the salinity levels in effluents and
available brackish waters (Schwartz, 2001). The transition to drip irrigation for many
crops from the 1970s onward has allowed many Israelis farmers to maintain
productivity even as actual allocations were cut periodically.
Reductions in allocations of water to agriculture were primarily enacted in the
face of droughts but also reflected a growing domestic demand for water. The
adaptability of Israel’s agricultural sectors and the relatively consistent fluctuations in
allocations over the past decade confirm that while agriculture’s general support is
fairly unquestioned, the actual quantity of water consumed is open to change and
influence of additional factors. In fact, recent data show that water consumption in
agriculture is declining.
1983
Agriculture
Domestic
Industry
Total

71
23
6
100

1993
64
29
7
100

2003
56
38
6
100

Table 1: Potable water consumption by purpose in percentages (Source: Israel
Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004)
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Not only the actual magnitude but also the form of the agricultural
community’s water portfolio can be considered a dynamic factor. Past experience
suggests that it is a nimble sector that has frequently changed its crop profiles in order
to exploit market opportunities or to respond to the agronomic constraints posed by
different water qualities. This same flexibility can be seen in its utilisation of
wastewater, which as already mentioned provides it with a growing percentage of its
hydrologic needs (Table 2). Cultural resistance to wastewater, that has been an
obstacle to its utilisation in certain Arab societies, constitutes less of a barrier among
Israeli communities. Although the use of wastewater for domestic purposes has been
shown to be unpopular (Lipchin, 2003). The amount of fresh water (potable) being
consumed by agriculture is declining somewhat, although the savings of fresh water
in agriculture are being rapidly consumed by the growing domestic sector.
1993
Potable
Effluent
Brackish
Surface
Total

71
12
6
11
100

2003
56
24
11
9
100

Table 2: Water production in agriculture by type in percentages (Source:
Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004)

From an empirical perspective, the primary factors that can be associated with
any reduction in agricultural productivity, and hence water, involve land conversion.
For many years, the powerful stature of agriculture in Israeli political culture was
bolstered by the Planning and Building Law (1965) that gave agricultural zoning
preference as a “default” to any land that was not designated otherwise. During the
1990s, a series of decisions changed that and led to a softening of zoning lines, which
had previously locked farmers into agricultural usage. At the same time, economic
conditions and high inflationary loans pushed many farmers to take advantage of the
new “speculative” opportunities and sell out (Feitelson, 1997). This transformation
can be seen in such regions as the Sharon and Galilee. It also changed the perception
of farmers among environmentalists, who increasingly valued agriculture as a hedge
against urban sprawl.
Israel’s national water management system since its inception has been
designed to subsidise agricultural production. Water prices constitute one of the
clearest economic manifestations of the aforementioned ideological commitment to
agriculture. Under Israel’s Water Law (1959) farmers pay a low-base price for the
first 50% of their water allotment. The price increases for the next 30% and 20%
respectively. Water prices for water with high concentrations of salinity or effluents
can be as much as 100% cheaper. This provides a disincentive to water conservation,
Lipchin, C.
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2006

12
13

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 97 [2006]

A Future for the Dead Sea Basin
as low-grade saline water is cheap to use. Urban uses can be charged as much as eight
times more. In recent budgets, the cost of water subsidies has been roughly 73 million
dollars (U.S.). As one commentator explained, frequently, the most expensive water
that is actually delivered will be priced at the lowest level (Plant, 2000).
In the past, drops in domestic water use came through moral suasion. When
the Israeli public was convinced that the water shortage was acute and genuine, it
responded by reducing their consumption. Lawns were dried up and even cemented
over, shower times shortened, and water saving devices installed in bathrooms etc.
The agricultural sector was also politically more willing to accept water allocation
reductions. For example, when Israel’s Supreme Court disqualified spartan water
quotas issued by Water Commissioner Dan Zaslavksy in the early 1990s, left with
little alternative he made a direct appeal to the public. Given the three successive
years of drought that had depleted and overdrawn Israel’s fresh water resources
considerably he asked Israelis to cut back. The public responded positively.
Subsequent to Zaslavksy’s request, some 10% drop in overall use was recorded (Tal,
2002). Albeit, this drop was temporary, as the following above average rainfall years
resulted in cut backs to be withdrawn.
In other areas, Israelis have shown a great willingness to pay for public natural
resources when they felt they were threatened, their crushingly high tax burden not
withstanding. For example, in the wake of arson in the Carmel forests, citizens made
substantial donations to telethon campaigns designed to cover the replanting expenses
(Shechter, 1996). Entrance fees to nature reserves and parks have not excessively
deterred visitation rates. As the availability of desalinated water increases, Israelis
will, for the first time be able to manifest their “willingness to pay for water,” with a
potentially unlimited supply of water, but for a price. Here, societal support for
alternative users of water (nature, agriculture) can be expected.
Ironically higher rainfall may have an important role in influencing this
particular factor. That is to say, when there is drought, the predictable efforts to
galvanise the public to reduce water consumption have varying degrees of success,
depending on the integrity of the appeal and the message. During wet periods,
however, while there are basic infrastructure improvements (for example
dissemination of two tank toilets, etc.) there is less of an actual appeal for restraint
and conservation and the issue of demand management remains tucked far away from
public consciousness. In other words, a crisis management response dominates the
public’s behaviour. The challenge is to convert this response to a sustainable one that
pre-empts crisis rather than responding to it.
In sum, the water culture in Israel is driven by the hegemony of agriculture
that is rooted in Zionist ideology. Demand management and conservation are
retroactive and are short term responses to crises and not proactive and long term.
Supply side management dominates with special attention being focused on
technological panaceas to the water crisis such as the building of desalination plants
on the Mediterranean coast and the proposed Red-Dead Conveyance project already
discussed above.
Lipchin, C.
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper97

13
14

Lipchin: A Future for the Dead Sea Basin: Water Culture among Israeli

A Future for the Dead Sea Basin

Water Culture in Palestine and Jordan
There are several objective differences between the water resources in the Palestinian
and Jordanian sectors and those in Israel. The most obvious one involves absolute
quantities of available water. Israel currently has the upper hand in control of both
surface and ground waters of the Jordan River watershed. At the same time, water
delivery infrastructure in Jordan and Palestine is not as developed as it is in Israel.
This means that water quality is not a high concern in Israel but it is for Jordan and
Palestine. The discrepancy in both water quantity and quality is an important factor in
the water culture of Jordan and Palestine. The consumption patterns of water by
Palestinians is thus due in part to political constraints (Hosh, 1995). The most basic
disparity between Israeli and Palestinian attitudes towards water can be traced to how
much they receive, or “per capita” allocation rates. The average Israeli consumes
roughly 350 cm/year while Palestinians roughly 100 cm/year.
Use
Domestic
Agrarian
Total

1995

1996

44
56
100

1997
48
52
100

45
55
100

1998
44
56
100

Table 3: Water consumption in Palestine in percentages (Source: Palestinian National
Information Center)
Sector
Domestic
Agricultural
Total

1985

1989
24
76
100

25
75
100

1995
22
78
100

2005
22
78
100

Table 4: Water consumption in Jordan in percentages (Source: Shannag and AlAdwan, 2000)
In absolute terms, agriculture is a far smaller consumer of water in both Jordan
and Palestine than in Israel. The division between domestic/industrial and agricultural
usage is roughly 89 MCM for agriculture with 57 MCM for the domestic sector,
ironically making Palestinian agricultural a relatively greater consumer of water than
the Israeli sector. Of course the water management profile of agriculture in the West
Bank is completely different than in the Israeli sector. For example, irrigation
techniques in the West Bank do not rely on capital intensive drip systems, although
this depends on the region and crop. Indeed, traditional Palestinian reliance on rainfall
and streams, and lack of an irrigation-based agricultural sector is considered by
leading Palestinian experts to be an ecological advantage (Assaf, 1994).
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Another difference is the relative contribution of surface water to overall
resources. Roughly 70% of Jordanian waters (747 MCM) is surface waters with only
389 MCM coming from groundwater while there are some 527 known springs in the
West Bank, providing roughly half of domestic consumption. As these springs
historically were not regulated by the Israeli authorities, historic rights remained in
force. Some 67% of these streams are utilised – roughly two-thirds by agriculture in
the West Bank with the other third used for domestic purposes. Wastewater reuse in
Jordan is still fairly minimal. As of 2000 wastewater generated only some 13 percent
of the 521 MCM being utilised for irrigation in agriculture, largely for trees and
fodder (Al-Shreideh, 2000).
The enormous magnitude of lost water to delivery systems has been
documented in a number of contexts (Palestine Hydrology Group, 2000) with as much
as 30% loss of local waters attributed to leaky pipes (Palestine Academic Society for
Study of International Affairs, 2002). Jordan suffers from similar problems with
frequent pipe bursts and seepages through ageing water systems considered a major
source of water loss (Khatib, 1998). While theoretically, this problem falls in the
technological rather than the social realm, clearly expanding water efficiency in the
municipal sector through investment in infrastructure is driven by social/political
considerations. For example, the hesitancy of Palestinians to rely on Israeli
technology as this may indicate recognition of Israeli sovereignty of water resources
in Palestinian territory.
In general, the relative scarcity of water (both in terms of quantity and quality)
in Jordan and Palestine drives local perceptions and attitudes towards this resource.
An additional factor driving attitudes is the traditional use of water in some villages in
the West Bank and Jordan. Where local control of water still remains, water
allocations for agriculture are socially determined. Unfortunately, these systems are
under threat as centralised authorities such as the Palestinian Water Authority begin to
assume control. Further, the dominant role of political instability and the recent
Intifadah within the day-to-day reality of Palestinians has enormous manifestations
within the social dynamics of this society regarding water. In fact, it is a key element
in the water culture of Jordan and Palestine due to the hegemonic position of Israel.
While Israelis are vaguely aware of the geopolitical conflict in the area as a
source of tension regarding water allocations, these issues are extremely high in the
perceptions of Palestinian communities. The Oslo accords brought with them a spate
of public works projects, largely American funded, with the goal of strengthening the
water infrastructure of the West Bank.
The impact of the military activities of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) on
water infrastructure is frequently cited as exacerbating a situation that was already
extremely deficient. The freezing of critical water infrastructure projects (e.g., the
sewage treatment plant in Hebron or Sulfit) as a result of the present hostilities
suggests that to a large extent there is justification for linking water policies with the
broader context of Israeli-Palestinian relations. In a word, for the West Bank, the
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present round of hostilities affects everything, with water management and
perceptions of water issues being no exception.
During periods of curfew, water delivery becomes a critical issue for all
Palestinian citizens, regardless of socio-economic class. Basic access to drinking
water becomes the primary focus of households. Showers and personal hygiene are
delayed so as not to waste valuable water. As bottled water is too expensive for most
of the population, tap water (or delivery in trucks for the 200 villages that remain
without running water) is the critical resource, and during summer months, supply is
sometimes interrupted.
As such, Palestinians tend to blame Israel for water scarcity problems. A
pervasive sense of injustice in the allocation of water resources is a common feature
of almost all Palestinians’ personal ideology, regardless of the individual’s political or
theological inclinations.
While the Jordanian population has less direct contact with Israelis and its
water resources, for many years geo-political forces have only indirectly or
“historically” affected them. Hence while their attitudes on the subject are less
passionate, there are varying degrees of blame apportioned to Israel and their
upstream neighbour, Syria for the shortages. Overall scarcity constitutes the basic
common factor in Jordanian perceptions. There is of course, a solid objective basis for
this. With water delivery in Amman only reaching homes once a week in many
neighbourhoods, significant planning is necessary to meet basic domestic needs
(laundry, hygiene, cooking, etc.).
Cisterns and storage of rainwater constitutes a basic element in many
Palestinian and Jordanian homes. This direct involvement by citizens offers a constant
reminder of perennial shortages. In other words, the citizens experience in generating
their own water, makes them appreciate the resource and they are acutely conscious of
its value as opposed to residents of Israel that are buffered from personally
experiencing scarcity due to efficient water distribution infrastructure.
With scarcity dominating local perceptions, other uses of water are often
perceived as frivolous or irrelevant. For example, should a conflict between nature
and human needs arise, the acute shortage among Palestinian and Jordanian
communities makes concern for natural values, such as that of the Dead Sea,
considered to be a “luxury” with the expansion of supply for basic human needs
considered to be the pre-eminent priority in discussions. A peace treaty that included a
redistribution of water for the region that included allocations for nature (as well as
generating expanded supply) may be able to change this perception by leveraging a
parallel increase in water allocations to consumers in Jordan and Palestine.
Water prices are set at an artificially low level in Jordan and Palestine in order
to ensure universal access, regardless of economic capabilities. Bottled water,
although widely available in stores, is only utilised by a small percentage of the local
population due to the high (relative to income) associated costs. Tap water is
sufficiently expensive, and unavailable to justify a variety of “collection” activities by
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local populations in both Jordan and Palestine, where individuals drive to springs or
private treatment centres and fill up containers.
Farmers typically do not pay for water at all in either Jordan or Palestine.
Stream-supplied irrigation is received free of charge, due to the persistence of
historical rights. This suggests that any direct expenses assigned to them for water
usage will have an immediate affect on their agronomic decisions.
Water conservation is a highly developed ethos in both Palestinian and
Jordanian societies whereas it is lacking in Israel. Regulation of agricultural utilisation
is often done by social pressures, with the wasting of water considered to be an
inappropriate behaviour which brings with it social repercussions.
The government in Jordan has invested considerable energies in promoting
conservation practices and the public has been largely responsive. Calls for
installation of water saving devices in toilets, baths, showers and sinks have been
effective.
Unlike Israel where there exists a certain level of animosity towards the
agricultural sector for “wasting” limited water resources, Palestinian and Jordanian
farmers do not appear to be the subject of resentment by their urban countrymen. The
general public is aware of the poor quality of effluents, which are occasionally used
by the agricultural sector, and tends to have an “inflated” view of its contribution to
irrigation supply. As such, most city-dwellers have little desire to “compete” for these
sources of water.
Moreover, there is no “perceived” agricultural lobby driving public policy in
water in these sectors as it in Israel. In fact “agri-business” in Jordan is likely to exert
considerable influence on the thinking of the Minister of Water and the Minister of
Agriculture. The poorly organised subsistence farmers (fellahin) are less likely to
wield direct influence in the corridors of power, but at the local level they can be a
powerful force (Trottier, 1999). In either case, the political process in Palestine and
Jordan does not lend itself to making water a “hot” political issue in the domestic
context, if for no other reason, because of the issue’s public persona as one of many
areas of conflict involving Israel.
There are great gaps in the availability and quality of water in both Jordanian
and Palestinian societies. Palestinian communities without access to running water are
typically more indigent and rural. More importantly, they are more vulnerable to
contamination of springs, which provide a sole source of water for the at least 200,000
people in these villages. There are growing number of reports of utilisation of polluted
streams by Palestinians, notwithstanding their classification as a resource unfit for
consumption.
In Jordan it is more difficult to generalise regarding the rural sector. In the
area of Ghor Safi on the southern shore of the Dead Sea, for example, where
subsistence farming provides most of the livelihood, water quality is relatively poor. It
has been suggested that there is an attempt to provide “reverse discrimination” to
balance overall economic inequities. Hence, the poorer sections of East Amman are
thought to receive water of better quality than the wealthier sections because they
have the option of purchasing bottled water as an alternative.
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Historically, personal gardens have never been an important factor in the
household sector for most Palestinians and Jordanians. Although in West Amman
there are irrigated lawns, these are limited to among a very select, affluent sector, and
as the phenomenon remains marginal, their contribution to overall consumption is
minimal.
Residents of the Dead Sea Basin
Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians reside within the Dead Sea basin. The three
publics differ culturally, economically and politically which in turn influences their
water culture. The Israeli public has by far the lowest population density within the
basin. The total population of residents is approximately 1,500 individuals. The
majority of the residents reside in agricultural settlements (kibbutzim or moshavim in
Hebrew). The region is divided into two regional authorities. The southern Tamar
regional authority is located within Israel’s pre-1967 borders whereas the northern
Megillot regional authority is beyond the post-1967 borders. Any peace agreement
with the Palestinians will most likely result in a shift in Israeli demographics in the
basin. Date farming for export is the most profitable agricultural activity. Food crops,
primarily vegetable crops, are also grown. The largest industrial activity, located at
the southern basin, is the Dead Sea Works which extracts minerals from the Dead Sea
and is the world's fourth largest producer and supplier of potash products. Tourism is
also an important contributor to the local economy and is well developed with a string
of high class hotels along the western shore of the southern basin. Most of the
employees of the Dead Sea Works and of the hotels however, come from outside of
the basin.
The Palestinian population in the study area resides in urban and rural
communities as well as in refugee camps. The total Palestinian population in the study
area as of 2002 was 512,238. Most of the communities are located in the western part
of the Dead Sea basin, whereas the eastern part is sparsely populated. Economic
activities are local scale agriculture including livestock farming (sheep and goats),
stone quarrying and olive oil pressing. Manufacturing and service related industries
are practiced in the urban centres.
On the Jordanian side of the Dead Sea population estimates are approximately
54,000 people. Rural farming is the dominant activity. Both fruits and vegetables are
grown. According to land area cultivated: lemons, olives, tomatoes and beans are the
dominant crops. The rural farming community is estimated at 53,000 people. The
Arab Potash Company is located at the southern end of the Dead Sea and produces
similar products to that of the Dead Sea Works in Israel. The company employs 300
people who live on the premises. There are also three hotels located on the northern
basin on the Jordanian side of the Dead Sea.
Water consumption by sector varies for the three riparians. The dominant
sector in Israel is the industrial sector, primarily that of the Dead Sea Works. In
Palestine and Jordan agriculture is the dominant sector (Figure 4).
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Water consumption by sector in the
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Figure 4: Water consumption by sector in the Dead Sea basin (Source: Elisha, R,
2006)
The variability in water use across sectors and countries of the basin poses a
challenge for integrated water management. It is therefore essential that as a first step
towards integration a stakeholder assessment is carried out.
Assessing Local Attitudes Towards Water Use in the Dead Sea Basin
The following is an exploration of water culture at a local level among the three
nationalities of the Dead Sea basin with an attempt to compare the degree of
conformity of local attitudes to national positions. This analysis is also of value to any
decision support system for integrated water management in the region. The research
was conducted using two instruments. The first was a survey questionnaire targeted at
the residents of the Dead Sea basin in Israel, Palestine and Jordan. The second was a
series of focus group meetings (FGMs) with a select group of stakeholders in the
region.
The survey data are meant to assess the public’s point of view on the decline
of the Dead Sea. However, caution must be exercised in interpreting the survey data
due to the fact that people may interpret the questions posed by the survey differently,
many people may lack sufficient knowledge to answer a question correctly or
truthfully and many biases that may influence how a person responds may be present
and often unavoidable. This being said, surveys can provide some insight on where
the public stands on an issue and what they may be willing to accept and/or reject.
The data therefore are of use as they help frame the debate on an issue.
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Focus groups are a powerful means to evaluate where a particular group stands
on an issue. A series of meetings with a select group of stakeholders were held across
the basin to provide a more in-depth look into the fate of the Dead Sea. The FGMs
were held over a period of seven months. The FGMs were held respectively in Israel,
Palestine and Jordan. The FGMs were facilitated by an expert facilitator and were
conducted in the local language (Hebrew for Israel and Arabic for Palestine and
Jordan).
A total of seven FGMs took place: two in the West Bank with representatives
from the governmental, non-governmental and research/science sectors, and farmers,
three in Jordan with participants from the private, research/science and governmental
sectors, and two in Israel with representatives from the farming and kibbutzim
communities, governmental representatives and NGOs. The Jordanian FGMs offer a
more complete sample of the interests and opinions held by the various stakeholders
involved as participants from all the sectors involved were present. The views
expressed the attendees were summarized according to the following topics:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Water Shortages – General Perceptions
State of the Dead Sea
The Role of Agriculture
The Red Sea – Dead Sea Canal
New Water Investment
Cooperation

Survey Results
The survey instrument consisted of a combination of dichotomous choice and
close-ended questions to address (a) water use and consumption habitats, (b)
knowledge of water supply and demand infrastructure in the Dead Sea basin, (c)
support for conservation practices and willingness to pay for such practices and, (d)
the importance of international cooperation in future management of the Dead Sea.
The dichotomous choice section on water use and consumption habitats used a
5-point Likert scale (1 for strongly agree to 5 for strongly disagree with 3 being
neutral). The other sections of the questionnaire used close-ended questions.
Responses were coded for statistical analysis. The final section of the questionnaire
gathered socioeconomic and sociodemographic information from the respondents.
Pre-testing of the survey was conducted with an expert evaluator from Tel Aviv
University. The questionnaire was translated into Hebrew and Arabic with slight
variations in survey design according to cultural norms. A group of volunteers,
residents of the basin, and supervised by the author, disseminated the questionnaires
to the residents who were asked to fill out the questionnaire and return it the next day.
A random representative sample of both urban and rural residents of the basin were
selected (Table 5). Cross-cultural analyses were conducted among Israeli, Palestinian
and Jordanian respondents.
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Country
Palestine
Israel
Jordan
Total

Population
512,238
1,408
53,300
566,946

Sample Size
741
176
623
1,540

*Population sizes were independently selected by experts from the three countries

Table 5: Population Surveyed in the Dead Sea Basin*
A series of statements were posed to respondents on their water use habits,
their attitudes to the shrinking Dead Sea and the importance for transboundary
cooperation to save the Dead Sea.
According to the statement: Most families use more water than they need,
most respondents from all three countries acknowledged they uses more water than
was perhaps necessary. However, close to a third of Palestinians and
Jordanians disagreed with this statement whereas less than a third of Israelis disagreed
(Table 6).
Most families use more water than
they need
IL PA JO
Agree
74 73.2 69
Neutral
12 3.6
3
Disagree
14 23.2 28
100 100 100
Table 6: Most Families Use More Water Than They Need
A corollary to the above statement was what people thought about their
availability of their local water supply. For all three countries people were relatively
evenly split between confidence in local water supply meeting current needs versus
mistrust in local supplies meeting the communities’ needs (Table 7).

There is enough water to meet your
community's needs
IL PA JO
Agree
49 36.6 34
Neutral
13 15.8 13
Disagree
38 47.6 52
100 100 100
Table 7: There is Enough Water to Meet Your Community’s Needs
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In terms of being able to reduce the amount of water people use, over 50% of
respondents from all three countries admitted that this would be difficult to do.
Approximately 30% of the respondents said that their household water use could be
reduced (Table 8).
It would be difficult to reduce the
amount of water used in your
household
IL PA JO
Agree
54 56.8 55
Neutral
13 9.5 10
Disagree
33 33.7 35
100 100 100
Table 8: It Would be Difficult to Reduce the Amount of Water Used in Your
Household
The above statements reflect that although there are differences in national water
cultures, at the local level in terms of household water use, these differences are less
apparent.
The following statements attempted to reflect the resident’s perception on the
state of the Dead Sea.
Declining water levels are a cause for
concern
IL PA JO
Agree
93 85.1 83
Neutral
6.1 6.2 6.6
Disagree
1.2 8.7 11
100 100 100
Table 9: Declining water levels are a cause for concern
According to Table 9 the vast majority of residents across the basin all agree that the
declining water levels of the Dead Sea are a cause for concern. Going deeper, how do
people think about available water supplies in the region to meet demand both now
and in the future for agriculture, industry and domestic needs?
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There is enough water in the Dead Sea
region to support agriculture now and
in the future
IL PA JO
Agree
23 32.3 44
Neutral
25 30.9 21
Disagree
52 36.8 34
100 100 100
Table 10: There is enough water in the Dead Sea region to support agriculture now
and in the future
According to Table 10, approximately 50% of Israelis believe that there is not
enough water to meet the needs for agriculture whereas Palestinians and Jordanians
mostly either agreed or disagreed with this statement. Tentative conclusions to be
drawn are that Israelis are more aware of the status of water availability in the region
but also that their water consumption for agriculture is greater than in either Palestine
or Jordan.
In terms of water needs for industry, all residents mostly agree that water
supply will continue to meet water demand (Table 11). This result may reflect the
economic importance attributed to the industrial sector in the basin, at least for Israel
and Jordan. The importance of the mineral extraction industries in the basin cannot be
underestimated both in terms of their economical importance to the countries but also
in their impact on the Dead Sea. The evaporation ponds managed by the industries
contributes to an increase in the evaporation rate of the Dead Sea, exacerbating the
water level decline of the sea. It will be imperative for any integrated management
plan to include directly the industrial stakeholder community in the future
management of the basin.
There is enough water in the Dead Sea
region to support industry now and in
the future
IL PA JO
Agree
52 58.9 79
Neutral
19 23.3 8.9
Disagree
29 17.8 12
100 100 100
Table 11: There is enough water in the Dead Sea region to support industry now and
in the future
In terms of the domestic sector, some differences come to light. Israelis are
slightly optimistic that municipal water needs will meet demand whereas Jordanians
are not as sanguine (Table 12). Interestingly enough, it is the Palestinians, who face
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water scarcity directly, to be the most optimistic. This may reflect the low population
density of Palestinians living near to the Dead Sea or in the fact that their domestic
water is low with little capacity for it to increase in the near future.
There is enough water in the Dead Sea
region to support your community
now and in the future
IL PA JO
Agree
48 56.5 35
Neutral
15 9.4 13
Disagree
38 34.1 52
100 100 100
Table 12: There is enough water in the Dead Sea region to support your community
now and in the future
A vital water resource in the basin is groundwater. Most local water sources
come either directly from groundwater or from where groundwater comes to the
surface as springs. Agricultural use in the Palestinian sector is heavily dependent on
groundwater use and the Dead Sea Works in Israel gets most of its freshwater, which
is used for cooling purposes in its industrial processes, from groundwater. Water for
agriculture in Israel and Jordan on the other hand comes mostly from outside the basin
in terms of surface water diversions that brings water to the farmers from either
outside or from the northern portion of the watershed. People’s perceptions of
groundwater is therefore crucial for integrated management. It seems that only Israelis
favor a “keep pumping” option on groundwater use whereas many Palestinians and a
majority of Jordanians favor a “reduce pumping” option (Table 13).
This result may indicate the proximity the Palestinian and Jordanian
populations have on the dependence of groundwater and that many groundwater wells
are locally managed and knowledge of water levels is therefore necessary. In Israel,
on the other hand, groundwater pumping is centrally managed by a far off ministry
and the local population has little or no input. Their awareness therefore of the
important linkage of groundwater to the health of the Dead Sea may be minimal as
well as to ground water levels in general.

Opinions on groundwater pumping
IL PA JO
Keep pumping
54 44.6 36
Reduce pumping
46 55.5 64
100 100 100
Table 13:

Opinions on groundwater pumping (Data are percentages)
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Any integrated management plan for the Dead Sea basin will require by
default some form of cooperation by the riparians. It is therefore important to assess
the willingness of the population to work together in achieving this aim. The
following data sought to address the level to which the population of the basin is
willing to work together. In the data presented in table 14, respondents were asked to
consider who they felt to be the most responsible for the Dead Sea’s decline. They
were offered the following categories:
Palestine, Jordan, Israel, All of the countries, None of the countries, Don’t Know.
A large percentage of all respondents said that Israel was to blame (26% of
Israelis, 42% Palestinian and 23% Jordanians). However, many also said that all the
countries were to blame (41% Israelis, 37% Palestinians, 36% Jordanians). It is not
surprising that many feel that Israel is to blame as it is the hegemonic water user in
the basin. Nevertheless it is also encouraging that many consider all of the countries
equally responsible. This is an optimistic assessment on which an integrated
management plan could be built.
In your opinion, the entity most
responsible for the Dead Sea's decline
is…
IL PA JO
PA
1.8 3.6 3.1
JO
6.7 0.7 18
IL
26 41.6 23
All
41 36.5 36
None
6.7 3.7 5.8
Don't know
18 13.9 14
100 100 100
TABLE 14
is…

In your opinion, the entity most responsible for the Dead Sea's decline

Finally, we asked the respondents their viewpoint on cooperation in the basin
(Table 15). The overwhelming response was yes; cooperation with the neighbours is
favored in helping to address the decline of the Dead Sea. With such data in hand, one
may now begin to move forward on exactly how such cooperation will come about as
the data lead toward some kind of a mandate by the public for cooperation.
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It is important to cooperate with your
neighbors in managing the Dead Sea
IL PA JO
Agree
95 79.8 72
Neutral
3.7 10.4 11
Disagree
1.2 9.8 18
100 100 100
Table 15: It is important to cooperate with your neighbors in managing the Dead Sea
Focus Group Meeting Results
Water Shortages
All of the participants from all of the FGMs agreed that there is a water shortage in
the area both in terms of quality and quantity. However, the understanding about the
reasons and implications of this water shortage varied. For instance, the private
farmers in Jordan whose water is supplied regularly by the Jordan Valley Authority
believe that the shortages they experience are not critical and are due mainly to the
lack of maintenance or technology. Conversely, their scientific and governmental
counterparts are aware that the region is in fact water scarce along with understanding
the reasons for this both in terms of water diversion projects in the upper Jordan
watershed and regional climatological and meteorological conditions.
The participants from Palestine believe that they experience water shortages
due to both their location within the Eastern Mediterranean region and the current
geopolitical situation. Additionally, they believe that the lack of integrated transboundary water management has added to the uneven allocation of resources.
The Israeli residents from the Dead Sea Basin also see the water shortage problem as
one of allocation as there is competition for resources mainly between industry and
agriculture.

The State of the Dead Sea
All the participants believe that without intervention the future of the Dead Sea is
precarious. The disappearance of the Dead Sea will damage the region not only
economically but psychologically as well in terms of the loss of a unique ecosystem.
Thus all participants agreed that any solution to the decline in the Dead Sea must be
on a national (respectively) level with a balance met between industrial, agricultural
and private needs, with the Jordanian scientific representatives noting that the solution
must be holistic as the issue has an impact at both the regional and national levels.
The Palestinian representatives believe that the decline of the Dead Sea Basin
is mainly due to the unilateral management of the Jordan River by Jordan and Israel.
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While the participants from the scientific community in Jordan assert that it is also
due to decreased precipitation and the diversion of surface water bodies in the upper
part of the watershed.
The farming representatives from both Jordan and Israel mentioned the
diversion of water resources to serve the industries (chemical, tourism) within the area
playing a major role in the sea’s decline. Moreover the Jordanian farmers felt that
while there are some negative impacts such as lack of humidity and the appearance of
sinkholes, they also believe that there are potential benefits in the way of increased
land for agriculture.

The Role of Agriculture
With regard to the role of agriculture in the decline of the Dead Sea and the future of
agriculture in the area, there were differing opinions and beliefs. Most participants
agreed that current practices are not the most water efficient and changes need to
happen both in terms of crops being grown (Jordan no longer grants licences to high
water consumption crops like bananas) and technology being used.
Though drip irrigation is already currently used, there is a need for more
education about additional water resource alternatives. For instance the Jordanian
farmers were not aware of the possibility of using treated wastewater to irrigate their
crops. After a brief description was given of this technology, they were mostly
opposed as they felt it would harm their crops marketability. It is clear that there is a
need for more information and education about alternatives to be disseminated from
the “experts” (i.e. policy-makers and scientists) to the practitioner in order to
implement lasting change.
Current agriculture depends on European markets where prices change
rapidly, thus making it difficult for farmers to make long term plans. This economic
instability also creates uncertainty about the future of agriculture on a local level, as
the younger generations do not necessarily have the desire/ability to carry on the
family business. There is the additional belief of the farmers, both from Jordan and
Israel, that agriculture will become more industrialized in the future with the number
of farmers decreasing as the size of farms grow.
Most participants were of the opinion that investment in new technologies
(desalination, treated waste water) as well as new industry (biotechnology, gypsum,
tourism) would serve this region both in terms of water conservation and as way to
increase the economic viability of the communities living within the region.

Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal
At this point it is not clear whether this project is a reality due to the high cost and
potential environmental impact of such a project. If the canal is built the role that it
will play in the region will depend on the particular point of view of each stakeholder.
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The impact on the various stakeholders is not yet clear, and will be clarified with the
aid of the feasibility studies to be carried out soon by the World Bank. However, the
World Bank’s studies will not include social and environmental impacts so the
comprehensiveness of such studies is in some doubt.
The farmers in Jordan were interested in the project but expressed concern
about their land being damaged. The Palestinians on the other hand have rejected the
project in spite of their attempts to support the Jordanians without affecting their
water rights and the final status negotiations with the Israelis. Their rejection was a
response to the Israeli position towards considering the Palestinians as beneficiary
partners in the project and not as full partners. The participants believe that the project
will not be implemented without the acceptance of the three parties as required by the
World Bank.

New Water Investment
Aside from the proposed Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal, desalination, dams, artificial
recharge of the aquifers, micro scale water management, improvements in irrigation
technologies and the reuse of treated wastewater were mentioned as areas for further
development. However it was also noted that it is imperative to invest in education:
not only to educate the public, and future generations, about water shortages but also
to raise awareness about implications of not conserving this resource and to provide
effective methods for conservation.
The case of treated waste water serves to highlight the disparity in knowledge
and awareness between the public and the scientific community: the scientists and
environmentalists are all in agreement that the reuse of treated waste water should
become standard procedure in agriculture whereas the local farmers were less sure of
the concept, especially in Jordan. The perceived stigma of irrigating crops with treated
waste water is a concern among farmers who consider the practice to adversely effect
the acceptance and price of their crops in overseas markets. Social understanding of
the farmer’s point of view needs to go hand in hand with investment to spread
awareness about potential new water sources and to allay any concerns or questions
the farmers and public may have.
Cooperation
While the future of the Dead Sea Basin is unclear, it is clear from the responses of the
stakeholders that any resulting cooperation that will occur between the three nations
involved must be of obvious benefit to all those involved.
The benefits, for example, to Palestinians and Jordanians of working with
Israel, a country with high water productivity and water saving in agriculture, could
lead to exchange in the technologies and the know-how of efficient agriculture. This
could come as a benefit to the whole water thirsty region. The Israeli farmers, for their
part, would need assurance that a genuine division of the resources between the states
Lipchin, C.
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is not a threat to the Jewish settlements in the area, as is their concern about finding a
solution with Palestine.
It is the belief/hope of the Israeli and Jordanian environmentalists and policy
makers, at least, that the cooperation would result in a more stable region, bringing in
more settlement, investment to the area and helping the economies of the region.
Discussion
People think differently about water. Differences and similarities can be found among
Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians. The data also reveal a complex picture where in
some cases there is agreement on issues while on other topics there is disagreement.
The results from both the survey and the focus groups are meaningful. Besides
providing insight into the water culture of the three countries, they offer insight into
what kinds of policies may be acceptable for the management of the Dead Sea. For
example, education programs and conservation campaigns that consider the viewpoint
of the public and the various stakeholders may prove to be more successful than those
that do not consider these views.
In many cases the data reveal more questions than answers, specifically from
the survey data. But perhaps what the data do offer is what questions need to be asked
next and in what direction one should be headed in formulating an integrated
management plan for the Dead Sea. Teasing apart the reasons behind the responses
presented in this paper will require more in-depth anthropological and sociological
study. What has simply been revealed here is the complexity inherent in a society
where one’s social context is an important predictor or “shaper” of one’s perceptions
and attitudes about water. What one can say is that society, any society, should not be
seen as a homogenous unit, as was once considered by early anthropologists, but that
there are important individual differences within a society. This is especially germane
for a transboundary water resource such as the Dead Sea basin. I suggest therefore
that policy makers take a closer look at the heterogeneity in society and the ways in
which this heterogeneity shapes perceptions and attitudes.
Institutional, social, gender and economic issues related to water management
options for the Dead Sea basin are thus far more complex than what is currently
envisioned by engineers and policy makers. These issues need to be addressed
adequately to achieve equitable and sustainable water management. As we tease apart
the many layers by which people in any society act and interact, we need a greater
degree of precision on how people think about an issue.
In the case of the Middle East in general and the Dead Sea basin in particular,
the centralization of the water management system provides policy makers with a
clouded lens on how people respond to current policies of water management. This
lens hampers consideration of new policy structures, including more “disaggregated”
(often more local) policies that may be highly effective. This study provides a starting
point for such disaggregation by considering the water culture of communities as the
foundation upon which to build sustainable water policies—rather than as passive end
points of a centrally determined system.
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